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The Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of 
Humanitarian Intervention 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning hours of October 25, 1983, over nineteen hundred U.S. 
marines landed on the small island of Grenada and began a large scale evacua-
tion of the more than 1000 U.S. citizens who were residing in Grenada.! The 
United States' primary justification for its action was the protection of the U.S. 
citizens.2 Due to the chaotic state of the Grenadian government, U.S. authorities 
believed that intervention was necessary to prevent the citizens from being taken 
hostage.3 
The events which led to the political state of chaos in Grenada began thirteen 
days prior to the U.S. intervention, when the government under Prime Minister 
Maurice Bishop collapsed.4 Bishop had gained power in 1979 by overthrowing 
the constitutional government established under Sir Eric Gairy.5 Bishop, foun-
der of the New Jewel Movement,6 established a socialist government in Gre-
nada.7 Although Bishop had built strong ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union,s a 
growing number of his followers began criticizing him for not following hardline 
Marxist practices.9 Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, the leader of the 
1. N.Y. Times. October 26. 1983. at AI. col. 6; United States Forces in Grenada: Letter to the 
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. 19 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
1493.1493-94 (October 25.1983) [hereinafter cited as Forces in Grenada]. In addition to the 1900 U.S. 
forces. 300 troops from the Organization of Caribbean States landed on Grenada. Forces in Grenada. 
supra this note. at 1494. 
2. N.Y. Times. October 26.1983. atAl6. col. 2. In addition to the protection of U.S. citizens. the U.S. 
administration justified the U.S. action in Grenada as a joint effort. with the Organization of Caribbean 
States. to restore law and order in Grenada. Situation In Grenada: Remarks and a Question-and-
Answer Session With Reporters. 19 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1487. 1487 (October 25.1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Situation in Grenada]. This article does not consider the collective self-defense justification for 
the intervention. Rather. the article focuses on the justification of the protection of U.S. citizens. 
3. N.Y. Times. October 26. 1983. at AI. col. 2; Address by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam. 
83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 79.80 (No. 2081. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Dam Statement]. 
4. N.Y. Times. October 26. 1983. at A16. col. 4; Dam Statement. supra note 3. at 80. 
5. N.Y. Times. October 27. 1983. at A20. col. 1. 
6. See id. New Jewel Movement stands for the Joint Endeavor for Welfare. Education and liberation. 
ld. 
7. ld .• October 26. 1983. at A21. col. 1. 
8. ld. For a discussion of Bishop's relationship with the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc nations. 
see American Bar Association. Section of International Law and Practice. Report of the Committee on 
Grenada. January 25. 1984. at 2-4. 
9. Dam Statement. supra note 3. at 80. For a discussion of the events which led to Bishop's overthrow. 
see From a Grenadian Diplomat: How Party Wrangle Led to Premier's Death. N.Y. Times, October 30. 1983. at 
A20. col. 1. 
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resistance, attempted to overthrow Bishop at a meeting of the government's 
Central Committee. IO On October 14, 1983, Bishop was placed under house 
arrest. lJ When Bishop's supporters tried to free him a few days later, Coard's 
followers broke up the demonstration by shooting into the crowd and killing 
many of the supporters. 12 Later that day, followers of the Coard faction executed 
Bishop and several of his cabinet members and close foliowers.13 
After Bishop's execution, the government of Grenada was dissolved. 14 Al-
though General Hudson Austin then became chairman of a sixteen-member 
Revolutionary Military Council, neither he nor any other person officially con-
trolled the government. 15 Austin also retained his leadership over the People's 
Revolutionary Army (P.R.A.).I6 The P.R.A. immediately imposed a shoot-to-kill 
curfew on all the residents of GrenadaY In addition, the P.R.A. closed the 
airport, preventing the departure of U.S. citizens who wished to leave the 
island. 18 Given this chain of events, U.S. officials became concerned for the safety 
and welfare of the U.S. citizens living in Grenada. 19 Consequently, President 
Reagan initiated the rescue mission to prevent the citizens from being hurt or 
taken hostage.2o 
Although the U.S. public reacted favorably to the invasion of Grenada and the 
rescue of U.S. citizcns/lmost of the world community severely criticized the 
invasion.22 The U.S. action was characterized as "grotesque,"23 "deplorable and 
1 O. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
11. [d. 
12. !d., Forces in Grenada, supra note 1, at 1493. 
13. N.Y. Times, October 26,1983, at AI, col. 6; Statement by Ambassador Jeane]. Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the Situation in Grenada, 
83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74, 74 (No. 2081, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Kirkpatrick]. In addition to Bishop, 
those executed included: Granada's Minister of Education, Miss Jacqueline Greft; Grenada's Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Unison Whiteman; Minister of Housing, Mr. Norris Bain; the leader of the Grenadian 
Bank and the General Workers Union, Mr. Vincent Noel; and Mr. Fitzroy Bain, another prominent 
trade union leader. [d. (quoting Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica). 
14. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
15. !d.; see Statement of Ambassador Middendorf before the OAS Permanent Council, October 26, 
1983,83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 72,72 (No. 2081, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Middendoif Statement]. 
16. Middendorf Statement, supra note 15, at 72. 
17. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
18. See N.Y. Times, October 26, 1983, at A16, col. 4; Kikpatrick, supra note 13, at 75. 
19. N.Y. Times, October 26, 1983, at A16, col. 4; Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
20. N.Y. Times, October 26, 1983, at A18, col. 1. 
21. See, e.g., Auchincloss, Walcott & Fineman,Americans at War, 102 NEWSWEEK 52, 54 (November 7, 
1983); Swelling Applause fM thR Grenada Rescue, Executive Memorandum # 39, November 3, 1983 
[hereinafter cited as Executive Memorandum]. See also Ceremonyfor Medical Students From Grenada and U.S. 
Military Personnel, Remarks at the White House Ceremony, November 7, 1983, 19 WEEKLY COMPo OF 
PRES. Doc. 1536. 
22. N.Y. Times, October 27,1983, at A21, col. 1; see, e.g., id., October 26,1983, at A18, col. 3.; id., 
October 27, 1983, A19, col. 1; id., November 3, 1983, at A21, col. 1. 
23. Editorial in EL NACIONAL, CARACAS, quoted in The World Looks at Grenada, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, 
December 1983. 
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wholly unjustified ,"24 and "cold-blooded aggression."~5 Furthermore, despite the 
U.S. pronouncement that the overriding purpose of the action was the rescue of 
the U.S. citizens,26 many nations expressed the opinion that the protection of 
citizens was merely a pretext to justify the invasion.27 Immediately after the U.S. 
action was publicized, the President of the U.N. Security Council called an 
emergency meeting of the Council to discuss the situation in Grenada.28 At the 
meeting, the representatives from Nicaragua and Guyana proposed a draft 
resolution that condemned the U.S. action.29 Although this resolution was vetoed 
by the United States, the United States was the only member of the fifteen-
member council that supported the landing of U.S. marines on Grenada.30 
Moreover, by a vote of 108 to 9 with 27 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted a resolution "deeply deploring" the U.S. action and characterizing it as a 
"flagrant violation of international law."31 
International law prohibits the use of force in international relations.32 The 
use of force by a nation is permitted, however, when that nation is acting in 
self-defense.33 Many legal scholars argue that an additional exception to the 
24. Remark of Representative Faforwa of Nigeria at United Nations Security Council Meeting, 
October 26, 1983, S1PV 2489, at 17. 
25. Remark of Representative Natorf of Poland, id. S/PV 2489, at 21. 
26. Situation in Grenada, supra note 2, at 1487. 
27. See, e.g., Remarks of Representative Hoang Bich Son of Viet Nam, United Nations Security 
Council, October 26, 1983, S1PV 2489, at 13-15 ("[t]he pretext of protecting [U.S.] nationals smacks too 
much of the old colonialist gunboat diplomacy of past centuries to need further condemnation today."); 
remarks of Representative Natorf of Poland, id. at 18-20 ("[t]he fallacious arguments raised by the 
American Administration lack any justification and are totally unacceptable."). See also remarks of 
Representative Sahnoun of Algeria, id. at 42; remarks of Representative Vongsay of Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, id. at 82; remarks of Representative de Figueredo of Angola, October 28, 1983, 
S1PV 2491 at 76. 
28. N.Y. Times, October 26, 1983, at A18, col. 3. 
29. Id., October 27, 1983, at A19, col. I. For the text of the draft resolution see S116077/Rev.1. 
Zimbabwe also joined in sponsoring the resolution. See October 26, 1983, S1PV 2489, at 3-5. 
30. Meeting of UNSC, October 28, 1983, S1PV 2491 at 197. The nations voting for the resolution 
were China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and Zimbabwe. Those nations which abstained were Togo, United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Zaire. !d. 
31. G.A. Res. 3817 (XXXVIII), noted in, N.Y. Times, November 3, 1983, at A21, col. I. Those voting 
against the resolution were United States, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, EI Salvador, 
Israel, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and Grenada. Id. 
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."!d. In addition to the U.N. 
Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) supports the principle of non-
intervention. See OAS CHARTER, art. 15, art. 17. Article 17 states that "the territory of a State is 
inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of 
force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever .... " Id. at art. 17. For a 
discussion of the OAS Charter and the protection of human rights see Cabranes, Human Rights and 
Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. R. 1147 (1967). 
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
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prohibition against the use of force exists when a nation intervenes in the affairs 
of another nation for humanitarian purposes.34 Two doctrines exist which em-
body the principle of intervention on humanitarian grounds: the protection-of-
nationals doctrine, which permits intervention by a state to protect its own 
citizens, and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which sanctions the use 
of force to prevent violations of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the 
victim.35 The legality of intervention on humanitarian grounds is recognized by 
both jurists36 and state practice.37 Given the apparent ineffectiveness of collective 
measures from the United Nations, many scholars support the use of unilateral 
intervention to protect human rights. 38 
Proponents of humanitarian intervention have set forth criteria to assess the 
legality of a state's rescue measures.39 When conducting a rescue effort in the 
territory of another nation, a state must use only the amount of force necessary 
to achieve the purpose of the mission.40 Furthermore, the rescue effort must be 
promptly disengaged as soon as its purpose is achieved. 41 Scholars have also set 
forth criteria which define the situations which would warrant the initiation of an 
act of humanitarian intervention.42 The legitimacy of the initiation of the inter-
vention is judged by the immediacy of the human rights violation,43 the extent of 
the violation,44 the existence of an invitation by the recognized government of 
the state,45 and the availability of alternative recourse. 46 
This article examines the current validity of the right of humanitarian inter-
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security .... " Id. 
34. E.g., McDougal & Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 178 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & 
Reisman]; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help fry States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 344-45 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Lillich, Forcible Self-Help]; Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of 
Intervention in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 24-25 a.N. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter 
cited as Moore, Regulatinn]; Stowell, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-62 (1921). 
35. Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 
GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 29, 32 (1980). 
36. See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 178; Lillich, supra note 34, at 344-45; Moore, 
Regulation, supra note 34, at 24-25. 
37. See Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current 
Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 205-13 (1974). 
38. See, e.g., id. at 257-58. 
39. E.g., Moore, Regulatinn, supra note 34, at 24-25; Lillich, Forcible SelFHelp, supra note 34, at 
347 -51; Fonteyne supra note 37, at 258-68. 
40. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 349-50. 
41. Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25. 
42. E.g., Moore, Regulatinn, supra note 34, at 24-25; Lillich,Forcible Self-Help, supra note 33, at 347-51; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258-68. 
43. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 347-48; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 260. 
44. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 348-49; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258-60. 
45. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 349; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 267-68. 
46. Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; Fonteyne, supra note 264-65. 
1985] THE GRENADA INVASION 417 
vention under the U.N. Charter. The article discusses the criteria used by legal 
scholars to determine the propriety of the initiation of an interventionist act. The 
article next examines the United States' reliance on humanitarian grounds as a 
justification for the Grenada rescue effort. This article does not address whether 
the United States used the proper means to carry out the intervention. Rather 
the sole focus of the article is on the legitimacy of the initiation of the Grenada 
rescue effort. In analyzing the necessity of the U.S. action in Grenada, the article 
reviews the Iranian hostage crisis and the need for states to act before hostages 
are taken. The author concludes that, in light of the various criteria proposed by 
legal scholars, the initiation of the U.S. intervention in Grenada to protect the 
U.S. citizens was proper under international law. 
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVENTION FOR 
HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES 
In order to advance the importance of the sovereignty of nations, traditional 
international law repudiated intervention by one state in the affairs of anotherY 
In the nineteenth century, many scholars espoused a theory of absolute non-
intervention, contending that intervention in the affairs of another state is never 
permissible.48 On the other hand, a substantial body of writers believed that 
while non-intervention was the rule, intervention could be justified when it was 
necessary to protect human rights.49 This latter approach to intervention gained 
acceptance from many twentieth century scholars,o° Although the doctrine of 
non-intervention became a norm of customary internationallaw,51 an exception 
to this norm was recognized when human rights were being protected.52 This 
exception of intervention for humanitarian purposes was exemplified by two 
doctrines: the protection-of-nationals and humanitarian intervention.53 
The protection of nationals as a basis for intervention developed out of a 
state's responsiblity towards resident aliens.54 Although states were traditionally 
permitted to treat persons within their borders as they wished,55 international 
47. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, International Law 319 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). 
48. See R. VINCENT, NON-INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 45-633 (1974). 
49. See, e.g., H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS 627 (J. Scott ed. 1929); W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (8th ed. 1924). For a detailed listing of the many authorities who supported 
humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth c.entury see Stowell, supra note 34, at 55-58. 
50. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM,supra note 47, at 312 ("[there exists] a substantial body of opinion and of 
practice in support of the view that there are limits to [the] discretion [of States in the treatment of their 
own nationals] and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its 
nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of 
mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible." 
51. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 47, at 305. 
52. Id. at 312. 
53. Fairley, supra note 35, at 32. 
54. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 349-54, 448 (1915). 
55. See BORCHARD, supra note 54, at 349. 
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law required each state to accord to aliens a minimum standard of treatment with 
regard to their life, liberty, and property.56 If a state did not fulfill this obligation, 
the alien's sovereign state was permitted to enforce compliance with this mini-
mum standard.57 
The right of a state to use force to protect nationals within the territory of 
another state has been acknowledged by modern legal scholars.58 One scholar 
has argued that the right to protect citizens abroad is limited to those circum-
stances where the foreign state has not furnished such protection.59 The fre-
quent state practice of intervening to protect citizens abroad also supports the 
validity of this doctrine.60 
While the protection-of-nationals principle permits intervention by a state on 
behalf of its own citizens, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention sanctions 
the use of force to protect persons from abusive treatment regardless of their 
nationality.61 The customary international law right of humanitarian interven-
tion has been justified on the theory that the offending state has abused its 
sovereign rights by mistreating its own nationals.62 Consequently, the state is not 
entitled to invoke a claim of absolute sovereignty against the intervening na-
tion.63 
The primary purpose for the development of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention was to protect citizens from abusive acts by their own government.64 
The doctrine, however, has also been extended to support the use of force by a 
56. !d. at 39. 
57. Id. at 349-52. Measures of enforcement available to the protecting state ranged from diplomatic 
discussions to actual war. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 307 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 
THOMAS & THOMAS]' 
58. E.g., BORCHARD, supra note 54, at 448-53; BOWETT, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 
(1958); BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289-301 (1963); JESSUP, A 
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1949); I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 309; see generally DUNN, THE 
PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932). 
Id. 
59. JESSUP, supra note 58, at 169. jessup states: 
Traditional international law has recognized the right of a state to employ its armed forces for 
the protection of the lives and property of its nationals abroad in situations where the state of 
their residence, because of revolutionary disturbances or other reasons, is unable or unwilling 
to grant them the protection to which they are entitled. 
60. See BROWNLIE, supra note 58, at 289-301; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 57, at 312-26. 
61. Fairley, supra note 35, at 32. Stowell defines humanitarian intervention as "[t)he reliance upon 
force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is 
so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign 
is presumed to act with reason and justice." STOWELL, supra note 34, at 53 (1921). 
62. See A. Thomas & A. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Grisis 1965. 13 IXTH HAMMERSKOJLD FORUM 
(1967) quoted in Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205, 210 (1969). 
63. See id. 
64. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 332. For a complete history of the doctrine including a 
summary of 19th century examples of humanitarian intervention see GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22-43 (1962). 
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state to protect its own nationals and the nationals of a third state.60 Humanita-
rian intervention has been acknowledged by both legal scholars66 and state 
practice.67 
III. THE EFFECT OF THE U.N. CHARTER ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The U.N. Charter reinforces the principle of non-intervention and stresses the 
importance of state sovereignty.68 Article 2( 4) expressly forbids "the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.'·69 
Article 2(7) prevents intervention by the United Nations in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.70 Subsequent resolutions 
of the U.N. General Assembly further embody the Charter's strong protection of 
the sovereign equality of States.71 For example, the U.N. Declaration on the 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States asserts that "[t]he strict observance by States of the 
obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential 
condition to ensure that nations live together in peace."72 
65. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra, note 33, at 332; see Suzuki, A State's Provisional Competence to Protect 
Human Rights in a Foreign State, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 231, 243 (l9S0); Fairley, supra note 35, at 35. Fairley 
has argued that the legal distinction between protection-of-nationals and humanitarian intervention 
exists in theory but should be abolished in practice: "[w]ith respect to the use of force by states for 
humanitarian ends, it is submitted that the utility of the two-fold classification of customary interna-
tionallaw collapses for the purpose of assessing the legal propriety of humanitarian intervention in the 
post-1945 era." /d. 
Although the U.S. authorities classified the U.S. action to protect the citizens as "protection-of-
nationals," Dam Statement, supra note 3, at SI, the authorities could have labeled the action "humanita-
rian intervention" since the intervention was for humanitarian reasons. This article adopts Fairlev's 
approach and collapses the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and protection-of-nationals for the 
purpose of assessing the legality of the initiation of the Grenada invasion. As used in this article, the 
term humanitarian intervention includes the doctrine of protection-of-nationals. 
66. E.g .. McDougal & Reisman,supra note 34, at 17S; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 24-25; I L. 
OPPENHEtM, supra note 47, at 312; Lillich states that "[t]he doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
appears to have been so clearly established under customary international law that only its limits and not 
its existence is subject to debate." Lillich,Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205,210 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as lillich, Intervention]. 
67. See Ganji, supra note 64, at 22-42. 
6S. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. 
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see supra note 32 for the text of art. 2, para. 4. 
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state .... " /d. 
71. See Fairley, supra note 35, at 43-44; E.g., Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) 25 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. AlSOIS (1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. Al6014 
(1965). 
72. Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. AlSOIS (1970). 
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Although one of its express purposes is the protection of human rights,73 the 
Charter fails to include a provision permitting intervention to enforce this 
purpose.74 The Charter's only exception to the prohibition against the unilateral 
use of force is the right to use force in self-defense. 75 In addition, Chapter VII of 
the Charter provides for the right of collective self-defense against threats of 
international disorder.76 
The prohibitions against the use of force stated in the U.N. Charter and the 
absence of any provisions which sanction intervention on humanitarian grounds 
have lead many scholars to challenge the validity of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.77 On the other hand, some scholars express the view that, despite 
the Charter's provisions, the two doctrines have maintained their vitality.7B Prop-
onents of humanitarian intervention can be classified into two groups: those who 
believe that intervention is only permissible by a state to save its own nationals,19 
and those who support intervention to protect human rights regardless of the 
nationality of the victim.Bo Those scholars who support humanitarian interven-
tion to protect only nationals view intervention as an extension of the nation's 
right of self-defense.B' By equating the protection of nationals with the protec-
tion of the state itself, Article 51 is used to justify intervention to protect 
nationals. B2 
Many critics, however, argue that a broad interpretation of Article 51 presents 
many problems.B3 First, the wording of Article 51 emphasizes that an "armed 
attack against the state" is necessary before the state can invoke the right of 
seif-defense.B4 Literally, abusive acts against nationals in a foreign country would 
73. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3 states: "the purposes of the United Nations are: ... promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights .... " Id. 
74. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra, note 34, at 334. 
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See supra note 33 for the text of article 51. 
76. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. 
77. See, e.g., Brownlie,Humanitarian Intervention in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217, 
218-19,226 (j.N. Moore ed. 1974). 
78. E.g., McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 178; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 24-25; 
Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea JOT Constructive Alternatives in LAW AND 
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 241 (j.N. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Lillich,Reply]. 
79. See, e.g., Bowett, The Interrelation oj Theories oj Intervention and Self-Defense, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 44-45 (j. Moore ed. 1974); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use oj FOTce by 
Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 466-67 (1952). 
80. E.g., McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 178; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 24-25; 
Lillich, FOTcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 344-45. 
Id. 
81. Bowett, supra note 58, at 92. Bowett states: 
It has been contended that an injury to the nationals of a state constitutes an injury to the state 
itself, and that the protection of nationals is an essential function of the state. On this reasoning 
it is feasible to argue that the defense of nationals, whether within or without the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state, is in effect the defense of the state itself. 
82. See id. at 92, 184-89. 
83. E.g., Brownlie,supra note 58, at 429; Fonteyne,supra note 37, at 251; see JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF 
LAw 30 (1969). 
84. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 251 n.208. 
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not constitute an armed attack against the state itself.85 Second, critics fear that 
the use of the doctrine of self-defense as the legal basis for intervention on 
humanitarian grounds would encourage a disproportionate use of force in the 
intervention.86 Furthermore, equating the protection of nationals with the pro-
tection of the state itself creates a greater inclination on the part of the state to 
resort to force when any group of citizens is in danger, regardless of its num-
ber.87 
The second group of scholars that support humanitarian intervention state 
that such intervention conforms with the U.N. Charter.88 These scholars take a 
restrictive view of Article 2( 4) and state that intervention which is not directed at 
a sovereign state's political independence or territorial integrity is not prohibited 
under Article 2( 4).89 Consequently, these proponents maintain that Article 2( 4) 
does not preclude the temporary imposition caused by a rescue effort in a 
foreign state .90 Such an interpretation of Article 2(4) has been questioned by 
those who view any act of armed intervention as at least a temporary infringe-
ment upon the target state's territorial integrity.91 Moreover, many situations in 
which human rights are violated require more than a temporary imposition.92 
Proponents of the restrictive view of Article 2(4) argue that one of the pur-
poses of the U.N. Charter is the protection of human rights and only a restrictive 
view of the prohibition against the use of force is consistent with that purpose.93 
Article 55 reinforces the United Nations' commitment to the promotion of 
human rights.94 In addition, Article 56 recognizes the individual state's obliga-
tion to protect human rights.95 Although the framers of the U.N. Charter 
envisioned that the United Nations would be able to protect human rights 
effectively,96 the machinery necessary to implement this ability never mate-
85. See id. 
86. See Fonteyne, sUfrra note 37, at 252; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra, note 34, at 337. 
87. See Fonteyne, sUfrra note 37, at 252. 
88. See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman, sufrra note 34, at 177; lillich, Reply, sUfrra note 78, at 236-37. 
89. See, e.g., Lillich, Reply, sUfrra note 78, at 236-37; Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in 
International Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 262 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Moore,lntervention]. Reisman 
and McDougal argue: 
Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the 
political independence of the state involved and is not only not inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations but is rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory 
norms of the Charter, it is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4). 
McDougal & Reisman, sUfrra note 34, at 177. 
90. See McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 177. 
91. E.g., Brownlie, sUfrra note 77, at 222-23; Bowett, supra note 79, at 44-45. 
92. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 255. 
93. See McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 177; lillich, Reply, sufrra note 78, at 236-37. 
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 provides that "[t]he United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion." I d. 
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 56 states: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. 
96. See Fonteyne, sufrra note 37, at 257. 
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rialized.97 The United Nations failed to formulate the collective security mea-
sures proposed in Chapter VII of the Charter.98 Given the lack of effective 
international measures to protect human rights, many scholars acknowledge the 
right of unilateral action by states to enforce human rights.99 If the United 
Nations does develop the capacity to deal with the abuses of human rights, a 
state's ability to resort to forcible self-help may be precluded. lOo Until such 
international measures are developed, however, humanitarian intervention will 
continue to prevaiJ.1Ol 
IV. THE CRITERIA WHICH LIMIT THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GRENADA ACTION IN LIGHT OF THESE 
CRITERIA 
While many scholars recognize the right of a state to engage in humanitarian 
intervention to save its citizens, a state's use of this doctrine is not unrestricted. 
The enormous potential for abuse in the invocation of humanitarian interven-
tion,102 has led proponents of humanitarian intervention to agree that the use of 
force under this exception must be limited. lo3 Commentators examine the dura-
tion of the mission and the degree of coercive measures employed to determine 
whether a state has properly carried out its rescue efforts.I04 According to 
criteria proposed by these legal scholars, a state must use only the amount of 
force necessary to conduct the missionlo5 and must promptly disengage the 
mission after its purpose is achieved. 106 Furthermore, authorities have listed 
various criteria which limit the circumstances in which humanitarian interven-
97. Id.; See also Lillich, Reply, supra note 78, at 245; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 335. 
98. See Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 257 n.230. 
99. See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman,supra note 34, at 178; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258. For a listing 
of those scholars who acknowledge the doctrine of humanitarian intervention see Lillich, Reply, supra 
note 78, at 241. 
100. See Lillich, Reply, supra note 78, at 244; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25. 
101. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 345 n.116. Fonteyne argues that urals long as the 
world community appears unable or unwilling to promptly respond in a collective manner to those 
dramatic situations where the very nature and existence of man are threatened, individual initiatives by 
concerned States will have to be relied upon if a viable world is to be maintained." Fonteyne, supra note 
37, at 269. 
102. See Bowett, supra note 79, at 45. One commentator has noted that U[a]ny authorization of 
intervention creates a manipulative nexus that can itself be used as a justification for an abusive 
intrusion upon the legitimate autonomy of another State. An intervening state may claim to protect 
human rights so as to hide its dominant motive which is remote from altruism." FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A 
VIOLENT WORLD 161 (1968). 
103. See, e.g., Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 2425; Lillich, Intervention, supra note 89, at 218; 
Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order - Part 1,43 DENVER 
LJ. 439, 475 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Nanda]. 
104. See Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 349-50; Nanda, 
supra note 103, at 475. 
105. See, e.g., Lillich, Forcible SelrHelp, supra note 34, at 349-50. 
106. See Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 263-64. 
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tion may be intiated. ,o7 In judging the legitimacy of the initiation of an interven-
tionist act, authorities examine the immediacy of the violation of human 
rights,'OS the extent of the violation,'o9 the existence of an invitation by the 
recognized government 110 and the availability of alternative recourse. 111 By 
applying these four criteria to the factual circumstances present in Grenada, this 
article evaluates whether the initiation of the U.S. rescue effort to protect its 
citizens was justified. 
A. The Immediacy of the Violation of Human Rights 
In order to initiate a legitimate act of humanitarian intervention, the inter-
venor must make a good faith determination that there exists an imminent 
threat of a violation of human rights. l12 The only violations of human rights 
which would justify intervention are violations of the most fundamental human 
rights such as the right to life.113 The torturing and killing of a state's nationals 
are sufficient to establish a basis for intervention." 4 A state, however, need not 
wait until there has been an actual deprivation of human rights before interven-
ing." O Rather, a state is justified in intervening when it has made a good faith 
determination that its citizens are threatened. 116 
When a state's citizens have been taken hostage, the state is justified in making 
a determination that an imminent threat to its citizens exists and a rescue mission 
is necessary."7 The Israeli rescue of its citizens from the Entebbe airport illus-
trates a state's justified reliance on the presence of a hostage situation as indica-
tive of imminent danger." s The circumstances which necessitated the Israeli 
rescue effort began on June 27, 1976, when a group of terrorists hijacked a 
plane en route to Paris and forced it to land at Uganda's Entebbe airport with 
107. See Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 347-49; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258-61. 
108. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 347-48; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 260. 
109. Lillich, Farcible Sel{Help, supra note 34, at 348-49; Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; 
Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258-60. 
110. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 349; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 267-68. 
111. Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 264-65. 
112. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 260. 
113. See id. at 258-59; Moore, Intervention, supra note 89, at 264. 
114. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 259. 
115. Thapa, Humanitarian Intervention, 40 (unpublished thesis in McGill University Law School 
Library, 1968) quoted in Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 260. Thapa states that "[since] The main basis of 
humanitarian intervention is the protection of humanity, there cannot be a principle forcing the 
intervening party to wait until the destructive act has been committed. Such intervention being 
preventive rather than punitive, the existence of the imminent danger is sufficient .... " Id. at 40. 
116. Fonteyne. supra note 37, at 260. 
117. See Note, Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT'1. L. 117, 133 (1977). 
118. See id.; Krift, Self-Defense and Self-Help: The Israeli Raid On Entebbe, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'I. L. 43, 57 
(1977). 
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over 250 hostages.119 Although some of these passengers were released, the 
terrorists continued to hold 110 Israeli citizens and threatened to kill these 
passengers unless their demands were met within forty-eight hours. 12o When the 
government of Israel stated that it would negotiate with the terrorists, the 
terrorists extended the previous deadline an additional seventy-two hours.l2l On 
the morning of July 4, 1976,just hours before the second deadline, Israeli forces 
raided the Entebbe airport and rescued the hostages.1 22 After the Entebbe rescue 
operation, both supporters and critics of the action acknowledged the fact that 
there existed a real and imminent threat to the lives of the Israeli hostages.1 23 
As the Entebbe incident illustrates, a hostage situation is a strong indication to 
a state that its citizens are faced with imminent danger. 124 However, due to the 
limitations on conducting effective rescue efforts,125 a state should not have to 
wait until a hostage situation arises before implementing a rescue effort to save 
its citizens.126 The circumstances surrounding the Iranian hostage crisis illustrate 
the practical constraints upon humanitarian intervention when a state fails to 
intervene before its citizens are taken hostage. 127 
On November 4, 1979, Moslem students attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
and seized over 100 diplomatic personnel. 128 The takeover was part of an 
anti-American campaign launched against the United States for its alleged sup-
119. N.Y. Times, June 28,1976, at AI, col. 2. 
120. Id., June 30, 1976, at A I, col. 7; Id. ,July I, at A I, col. 4; Id. ,July 2, at A I, col. I. The demands of 
the terrorists were that fifty-three "freedom fighters" imprisoned in various countries be freed in 
exchange for the release of the hostages. Forty of these prisoners were in Israeli jails.ld., June 30, 1976, 
at AI, col. 7. 
121. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1976, at AI, col. I. 
122. Id., July 5, 1976, at AI, col. I. For a detailed account of the rescue operation see STEVENS, 
NINETY MINUTES AT ENTEBBE (1976). 
123. See N.Y. Times, July 5, at A4, col. 4; Id., July 5, 1976, at A3, col. 8. Uganda's president, Idi 
Amin, criticized the action as an attack to Uganda's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, he expressed 
thanks that the military had "repulsed the attack." Id., July 5, 1976, at A3, col. 8. A draft resolution 
sponsored by Benin, Libya, and Tanzania condemned the Israeli attack and called upon Israel to make 
full compensation to Uganda. This resolution never gained support and was withdrawn prior to voting. 
31 U.N. SCOR (1943d mtg.) 76, U.N. Doc. S1PV 1943 (1976). For comments of those supporting the 
Israeli action see remarks of representatives from France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 31 U.N. SCOR (1943d mtg.) 76. The U.S. delegate argued that "[there is] a well-
established right to use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from an imminent threat 
of injury or death in a situation where the state in whose territory they were located was either unwilling 
or unable to protect them." Id. 
124. See Krift, supra note 118, at 133. 
125. See Fairley, supra note 35, at 56. 
126. See Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 156 (1984) 
[hereinafter cited as Moore, Grenada]. 
127. Fairley, supra note 35, at 56-58; Fairley states that "The Iranian crisis graphically illustrates the 
point that humanitarian intervention will fall short of fulfilling its primary objective so long as the 
human rights violator takes the comparatively easy precautions necessary to prevent access [to the 
hostages] .... " Id. at 57. 
128. N.Y. Times, November 5, 1979, at AI, col. 6. 
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port of the recently ousted Shah of Iran.129 The militant students demanded the 
Shah's return from the United States in exchange for the hostages.1 30 Despite the 
United States rejection of this demand, the students remained committed to 
their original purpose.1 3l 
The U.S. authorities expected help from the Iranian government. 132 A few 
days after the embassy takeover, however, the ruling government collapsed. 133 
Ayatollah Khomeini then took control of Iran. 134 A strong supporter of the 
students' actions, the Ayotallah reinforced the commitment to keep the U.S. 
citizens hostage until the Shah was released. 135 Furthermore, the militant stu-
dents stated that Iran would kill the hostages if the United States used military 
force in a rescue attempt. 136 President Carter had previously ruled out military 
action as a means to free the hostages.1 37 Military experts and other authorities 
stated that an attempt to free the hostages had almost no chance of success/38 
and that such a rescue effort would only inflame the students and further 
endanger the lives of the hostages.1 39 Consequently, the President resorted to 
diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of the hostages.1 4o The hostages were 
eventually released after being held in captivity for 444 days.14l 
The inability of the United States to rescue the Iranian hostages supports a 
view of humanitarian intervention which would permit intervention regardless 
of whether the citizens have been taken hostage. The requirement of the im-
mediacy of a threat to human rights should be satisfied as long as the state has 
made a good faith determination that its citizens are in danger. 142 
The circumstances present in Grenada support the U.S. determination that 
there existed an imminent threat of danger to its citizens on Grenada. 143 Given 
the disintegration of political authority and the violent killings, U.S. authorities 
129. ld., at A 10, col. 3. 
130. ld., November 6, 1979, at AI, col. 6. 
131. !d. 
132. ld., November 5, 1979, at AI, col. 5. Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi had promised the Carter 
Administration he would try to gain the release of the U.S. hostages and to end the occupation of the 
embassy.ld. at A 12, col. 3. 
133. N.Y. Times, November 7, 1979, at AI, col. 6. 
134. ld. 
135. ld. at A14, col. 4. 
136. !d. at AI, col. 6. 
137. !d., November 7,1979, at A14, col. 6. 
138. ld. 
139. See id., November 7, 1979, at A14, col. 2. 
140. [d. at A 14, col. 6. The U.S. government did, however, attempt to rescue the hostages. ld. , April 
25, 1980, at A I, col. 6. This rescue effort failed due to equipment failure. !d. at A 14, col. 3. For a 
discussion of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt see N.Y. Times, April 26, 1980, at A 7, col. I. See also P. 
SALINGER, AMERICA HELD HOSTAGE (1981). 
141. ld., Jan. 21,1981, at AI, col. I. 
142. See Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 260. 
143. See Moore, Grenada, supra note 126, at 156. 
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feared that further violence would occur in Grenada. 144 Moreover, the imposi-
tion of a twenty-four hour shoot-to-kill curfew intensified U.S. authorities' con-
cerns that U.S. lives were in danger. 145 In addition to imposing the curfew, the 
P.R.A. also closed the airport, cutting off all exits from the island.146 
In light of the facts known, the U.S. authorities were justified in making a 
determination that the U.S. citizens were in imminent danger. 147 In addition, the 
U.S. citizens who were present on Grenada confirmed the existence of imminent 
danger upon their return to the United States. 148 Although the citizens had not 
been taken hostage, the situation in Grenada indicated that there was a strong 
possibility that, had they not been rescued, they would have been taken hostage 
by the revolutionary forces. 149 
B. The Extent of the Threat of the Violation of Human Rights 
In addition to imposing the requirement that the threat of a violation of 
human rights must be immediate, scholars also state that the threat of the human 
rights violations must be substantial. 150 The more people affected by the abusive 
act, the stronger the case is for intervention. 151 Not only do the numbers of 
people involved determine the extent of the violation, but the seriousness of the 
threatened violation also determines whether the intervention is warranted. 152 
For example, the U.S. justified the initiation of the rescue mission in the Domini-
can Republic as an emergency action taken to preserve more than 5,000 lives. 153 
On April 24, 1965, a group of military rebels attempted to overthrow a junta that 
had governed the Dominican Republic since 1963.154 Immediately thereafter, 
fighting between the two groups broke out and many civilians began to fear for 
144. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80; Forces in Grenada, supra note I, at 1494. 
145. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
146. N.Y. Times, October 26, 1983, at A16, col. 4. 
147. See Moore, Grenada, supra note 126, at 156. 
148. See Joyce, First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. from Grenada, N.Y. Times, October 27, 1983, at I, col. 3. 
149. N.Y. Times, October 27, 1983, at 21, col. 5. Evidence of a Cuban build-up and the lack of any 
concrete guarantees for the citizens' safety led U.S. officials to believe that "the Grenadian leaders might 
be using the Americans on the island as a bargaining chip." Id. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam 
specifically stated that "[sJometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation from getting worse .... 
Inaction would have made a hostage situation more likely and increased the costs in lives of any 
subsequent rescue operation." Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
150. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 348; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 258-59. 
151. See lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 348; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 259. 
152. See lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 348-49. lillich notes that "it is necessary to 
examine the type as well as the extent of human rights deprivation .... " Id. 
153. See Mann, The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 730, 734 
(1965). 
154. N.Y. Times, April 26,1965, at I, col. 8. The political situation in the Dominican Republic prior 
to April 24, 1965, was very unstable. The government had changed eight times between May 1961 and 
May 1965. /d.; see also Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEP'T ST. 
BULL 60, 61 (1965). 
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their safety.155 Although many persons wished to leave the country, the lack of 
commercial airflights and the indiscriminate shooting by the rebel forces dis-
rupted their evacuation efforts. 156 The disorder in the Dominican Republic 
became progressively worse as mobs terrorized the entire city of Santo 
Domingo.157 When the U.S. officials were informed that the lives of the U.S. 
citizens were in jeopardy and could no longer be protected by the police force or 
other authorities,15s President Johnson initiated a rescue mission which began 
with the landing of 500 marines in Santo Domingo. 159 
Similar to the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. action in 
Grenada was undertaken to prevent the death or injury of many persons. 160 The 
U.S. marines were sent to Grenada to evacuate over 1,000 U.S. citizens. 161 Re-
ports of the political upheaval in Grenada and the imposition of the shoot-to-kill 
curfew substantiated the claims that these citizens were in jeopardy. 162 Moreover, 
the citizens confirmed the danger when they returned to the United States.163 
Overall, the fact that a great number of U.S. citizens were threatened with a 
massive deprivation of human rights strengthens the humanitarian justification 
for the intervention.164 
C. Invitation by a Recognized Government 
When the recognized government of a state specifically requests another state 
to assist it in protecting the people within its border, the assisting state's rescue 
effort isjustified.165 In most situations, however, the state does not receive a clear 
and unambiguous request to intervene.166 Rather, the request may be tainted by 
duress. 167 Furthermore, when different factions are struggling for control, the 
legitimacy of a request from one of these factions is questionable.16s Unless the 
invitation from the recognized government is clear and unambiguous, it cannot 
155. 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19-20 (1965). PresidentJohnson in describing the situation in the Dominican 
Republic prior to the U.S. intervention stated "[slome 1500 innocent people were murdered and shot. 
and their heads cut off. and six Latin American embassies were violated and fired upon .... " [d. 
156. Mann. sufrra note 153. at 733-34; see Meeker. sUfrra note 154. at 61. 
157. N.Y. Times. April 27. 1965. at AI. col. 4; Mann.sufrra note 153. at 733; Meeker.sufrra note 154. 
at 61. 
158. Meeker. sufrra note 154. at 61. 
159. Mann. sUfrra note 153. at 734. 
160. See Dam Statement. sufrra note 3. at 80. 
161. [d. Of these 1.000 citizens, most were either students. missionaries. or retirees. The U.S. citizens 
represented the largest body of foreigners on the island. [d. 
162. [d.; Forces in Grenada. sUfrra note 1. at 1493. 
163. Joyce. First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. from Grenada. N.Y. Times. October 27. 1983. at 1. col. 3. 
164. See Moore. Grenada. sufrra note 126. at 156. 
165. See THOMAS & THOMAS. sUfrra note 57. at 91. 
166. Lillich. Forcible SelFHelp. sUfrra note 34. at 349. 
167. See Fonteyne. sufrra note 37. at 268. 
168. [d.; see also Bowett. sufrra note 79. at 42. 
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serve as the sole justification for an intervention.169 The existence of a request, 
however, is not a prerequisite to the initiation of humanitariall intervention.170 
Rather, an invitation to intervene constitutes one factor which will support a 
state's action. l7l 
In the Grenada incident, the request from Grenada's Governor General, Sir 
Paul Scoon, constitutes an additional factor in support of the U.S. interven-
tion.172 The United States, via the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(O.E.C.S.), received a request from Scoon asking for help to halt the anarchy 
which was occurring in Grenada.173 The United States claimed that this request 
constituted an invitation of a lawful governmental authority and, as such, is a 
"recognized basis under international law for foreign states to provide requested 
assistance."174 Scholars have questioned Scoon's position as the lawful authority 
in Grenada.175 The people of Grenada recognized Scoon solely as a British 
figurehead. 176 In addition, Scoon had failed to take an active role in the gov-
ernmental decisions of Grenada.177 The political instability in Grenada, however, 
strengthens Scoon's role as the lawful authority.178 Given the questionable nature 
of Scoon's authority, his invitation to intervene is not conclusive, but should be 
considered as one factor which supports the legitimacy of the rescue opera-
tion. 179 
D. The Existence of Alternative Measures 
Because the resort to force is such a severe measure, the right should only be 
invoked when there exists no other effective measure for protecting the human 
rights involved. ISO Before resorting to force, the prospective intervenor must 
make attempts to settle the situation peacefully.181 In addition, international 
169. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 349. Lillich argues that "anything less than an 
unambiguous request from a de jure government should be regarded as only one factor pointing towards 
[the legitimacy of the operation]." /d. 
170. See id.; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 268. 
171. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 349. 
172. See Moore, Grenada, supra note 126, at 156, 159. Moore argues that Scoon was the appropriate 
authority to issue the request for aid. /d. at 153 n.26, 159. For a discussion of Scoon's role in Grenada see 
id. at 159-61. See also Pace, In the Eye of the Grenada Storm, N.Y. Times, October 27, 1983, at A20, col.2. 
173. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
174. Id. at 80-81. 
175. See, e.g., Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of the Invasion, 78 
AM. J. INT'L L. 131,138-39 (1984). 
176. See N.Y. Times, October 27, 1983, at 18, col. 5. 
177. See Joyner, supra note 175, 138-39. 
178. See Moore, supra note 126, at 159. 
179. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra, note 34, at 349. 
180. See DeSchutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 21, 29-30 
(1972); Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 264-65. 
181. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 264; Jenks, supra note 83, at 30; see also Note, A Proposed Resolution 
Providing for the Authorization of Intervention by the United Nations, a Regional Organization, or a Group of 
States in a State Committing Gross Violations of Human Rights, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 340, 349-50 (1973). 
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organizations should be given the opportunity to deal with the situation before 
the state resorts to forcible self-help.'82 If it appears, however, that non-coercive 
means would prove ineffective, this requirement is waived. '83 
Due to the political upheaval present in Grenada, U.S. authorities believed 
that any diplomatic efforts to rescue the citizens would prove futile. '84 Conse-
quently, the United States made no concerted effort to protect the lives of its 
citizens through non-coercive means.185 In fact, the United States ignored assur-
ances from the Revolutionary Military Council, which stated that the U.S. citi-
zens were safe. '8s In a cable, which was sent the day before the invasion, the 
Revolutionary Military Council stated that the U.S. citizens were not in danger 
and would be allowed to leave the island if they desired. '87 The U.S. authorities 
responded to these assurances by stating that "in the absence of a functioning 
government, there could be no credible assurances of [the U.S. citizens'] well-
being and future prospects."188 
In addition to dismissing peaceful means of settlement, U.S. authorities also 
failed to invoke international measures to protect its citizens in Grenada. One of 
the criteria for the initiation of humanitarian intervention mandates that a state 
attempt to achieve a solution through an international organization before 
resorting to forcible self-help.'89 Even though the O.E.C.S. was involved in the 
Grenada invasion, the United States failed to contact the United Nations and ask 
it for its help in protecting the U.S. citizens in Grenada. '90 
The U.S. failure to pursue international security measures can be justified by 
showing that there was no prospect of timely and effective action by an interna-
tional organization. '91 As many scholars have noted, the United Nations has not 
provided effective measures to deal with threats to human rights. '92 Further-
more, the U.S. authorities believed that immediate intervention was necessary to 
182. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 34, at 188; Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 264-65; Moore, 
Regulation,supra note 34, at 25; Jenks, supra note 87, at 30. Jenks argues that "[w]herever practicable any 
such intervention should be undertaken by or on behalf of the United Nations. or through the 
appropriate regional organisation .... " [d. 
183. Fonteyne, supra note 37, at 264-65. 
184. See Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
185. See id. 
186. Boston Globe, October 27, 1983, at I, col. 3. 
187. [d. 
188. Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 80. 
189. See Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25. 
190. See Dam Statement, supra note 3, at 82. 
191. See Moore, Regulation, supra note 34, at 25. Jessup states that "[i]t would seem that the only 
possible argument against the substitution of collective measures under the Security Council for 
individual measures by a single state would be the inability of the international organization to act with 
speed requisite to preserve life." Jessup, supra note 58, at 170. 
192. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 34, at 345 n.116. Lillich notes that "the collective machinery 
to protect human rights envisaged by the United Nations Charter still awaits establishment." [d. See 
Thiele, Norms of Intervention in a Decoloniud World, llJ.INT'L L. & POL. 141, 146 (1978); see also, Nossiter, 
Iran is the Target but U.N. Can Only Fire Words, N.Y. Times, December 2, 1979, sec. 4, at I, col. I. 
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rescue the U.S. citizens on Grenada. 193 In light of the U.S. determination that 
prompt effective action was necessary and the United Nation's apparent inability 
to provide this action, the United States' failure to pursue international measures 
is justified .194 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States' landing of troops on Grenada for the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens should be considered permissible under the twin doctrines of 
protection-of-nationals and humanitarian intervention. Although these doc-
trines have not received unanimous support from legal scholars, they remain the 
only effective means for dealing with imminent threats of massive deprivations 
of human rights. While the U.S. justification for its action has been criticized, the 
statements of citizens rescued from the island and reports of the political up-
heaval on the island support the conclusion that the U.S. intervention was 
necessary and that the situation may have become worse if the U.S. had not 
acted. Until the United Nations provides an effective method for dealing with 
such potential human rights deprivations, a state's right to resort to force must 
be upheld. 
The circumstances present on Grenadajustified the U.S. intervention and met 
the critieria imposed by legal scholars. First, there existed an imminent threat of 
danger to the citizens. Second, the great number of lives that were in jeopardy 
supported a finding of wide-scale potential for human rights violations. Third, 
the request of aid from Governor General Scoon, while not conclusive, consti-
tutes an additional factor in support of the intervention. Finally, the United 
States had no effective alternative to ensure the citizens' safety other than 
unilateral self-help. Overall, in light of the factual circumstances present in 
Grenada, the initiation of the U.S. intervention to protect the V.S. citizens was 
permissible under international law. 
Laura Wheeler 
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